Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. Genaro Pantoja Corvera : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Kris C. Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Criminal
Appeals Division; Attorneys for Appellee.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold & Wiggins, PC; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Corvera, No. 20040918 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5324

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040918-CA

GENARO PANTOJA CORVERA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY PRESIDING.

KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone (801) 366-0180
SCOTT WIGGINS
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TROY S. RAWLINGS
E>eputy Davis County Attorney

Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040918-CA
v.
GENARO PANTOJA CORVERA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY PRESIDING.

KRIS C. LEONARD (4902)
Assistant Attorney General

MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone (801) 366-0180
SCOTT WIGGINS
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TROY S. RAWLINGS
Deputy Davis County Attorney

Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN APPROPRIATE INQUIRY
INTO AN ALLEGED PROBLEM WITH INTERPRETATION OF
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF ERROR
LACKS EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AND IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED

9

A. This Court Should Refuse To Reach Defendant's Claim Due To Inadequate
Briefing

9

B.

The Claim Fails Where Defendant Presented Insufficient Evidence Below
To Support It

13

CONCLUSION

16

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Affidavit of Laura K. Thompson in Support of Motion for New Trial
(R. 101-04)
Addendum B - Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial (R. 125)
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976)

11

Holbrookv. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986)

11

STATE CASES
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731

12

State v. Baker, 884P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1994)

13

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

13

State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073

10

State v. Boone, 820P.2d930 (Utah App. 1991)

13

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998)

10

State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611

11

State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, 52P.3d467
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120,63P.3d72

10, 12, 13
10,12

State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), overruled on other gnds,
State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1994)
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998)

13
2

State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, 57 P.3d 977,
cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002)

10

State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947)
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 12 P.3d 92

13
3

State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, 994 P.2d 1237

2
ii

State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 48 P.3d 872,
cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1062(2002)

10

State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 69 P.3d 1278
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,72 P.3d 138
State v. Thomas,961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)

2, 10, 11
10
10, 12

State v. Thomas, 1999UT2, 974P.2d269

13

State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942)

11

State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989)

10

STATE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (West 1998)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004)

1

Utah R. App. P. 24

2, 9

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifFAppellee,
Case No. 20040918-CA
v.
GENARO PANTOJA CORVERA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion for a new trial in the Second
Judicial District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay presiding.
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this Court by order dated November
18,2004 (R. 140), thus giving this Court jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) & Q) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Should this Court reject defendant's claim that the trial court breached a duty
to inquire about an alleged problem with translation of trial testimony where his argument
contains no relevant legal authority or analysis?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies to this issue.

Issue 2: Alternatively, did the trial court properly reject defendant's claim of error
because the self-serving affidavit of former defense counsel was insufficient to establish
either error or harm?
Standard of Review: Appellate courts "review the decision to grant or deny a motion
for a new trial only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ^[ 8, 994 P.2d
1237; see also State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^15, 69 P.3d 1278 (";[W]e will not reverse a
trial court's decision [to grant or deny a new trial] absent a clear abuse of discretion"5)
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 is relevant to a determination of the issue
presented herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 24, 2001, defendant was charged with one count of Aggravated Sex
Abuse of a Child, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1) (West
1998) (R.1).
After a two day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 64, R. 148: 181).
He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison (R.
98). Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial, supported only by an affidavit of
defense counsel (R. 100,101-05). The case then inexplicably stood quiet until defendant pro
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se sought information from the court in 2003 (R. 105-06). In May 2004, defendant again
contacted the court pro se seeking a review of the status of his case (R. 107). The trial judge
set a review hearing, prompting the prosecutor to file a written objection to defendant's new
trial motion three days before the hearing (R. 108-15). Defendant, through new appointed
counsel, sought and obtained trial transcripts, and the court conducted a hearing on the
defense motion on July 8, 2004 (R. 116-23). The parties presented no evidence but relied
solely on oral argument (R. 124: passim). The trial court denied defendant's motion from
the bench, issuing a written order on September 27, 2004 (R. 123, 125-26; R. 124: 10-12).
Defendant timely appealed the ruling (R. 127-28).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On December 24, 2001, defendant promised his thirteen-year-old niece he would
give her a Christmas present (R. 147: 12). He thereafter sexually abused her in front of
his young daughters (R. 147: 113-17).
Christmas Eve
Thirteen-year-old Maara was up late on Christmas Eve of 2001 looking after her three
nieces, ages four, two, and one (R. 147: 108, 111-12).2 Defendant was the girls' father and

]

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2

The State refers to minor victims and minor witnesses by first name or, where context
requires,firstname and initial. In so doing, the State does not intend to encourage this Court
to depart from its current practice of identifying minors in court decisions by initials only.
3

Maara's uncle (R. 147: 108-09). Maara and the children were in a room belonging to
defendant, his wife Lourdes, and their three girls, all of whom had been living with Maara's
family for a few months (id). Around 11:30 p.m., defendant came in and told Maara that
he would give her a Christmas present at midnight (R. 147:112). He then left the room with
his youngest daughter, who was crying (R.147: 113).
Maara9s Christmas Present
Ten minutes later, defendant returned, sat on the bed next to Maara, and "just started
kissing" her in front of his daughters (id). He began by kissing her "on the neck and then
he . . . started kissing [her] on [her] mouth and then he laid [her] on the bed and was just
kissing [her]." Id. When his daughters noticed his conduct, defendant "turned on the TV and
told them to watch it" (R 147: 114). He then "grabbed [Maara] by the arm and . .. jerked
[her] up and... took [her] into the closet." Id. With Maara partially concealed in the closet,
defendant put his hands up her shirt and under her bra and fondled her breasts (R. 147:116).
He then put his hands down her pants under her panties and touched her vagina (R. 147:
117). When he heard footsteps coming up the stairs to the room, he stopped and "told
[Maara] that if [she] told anybody[,] that he was going to kill [her] mom" (id). Maara ran
out of the room and down the stairs when Lourdes appeared in the doorway (R. 147: 118).
Lourdes saw Maara in the closet and began to argue with defendant about what he was
doing (R. 147: 166, 176). Defendant pulled out a knife, or the sheath of a knife, threatened
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to kill Lourdes if she told anyone what happened, and made a threatening motion with the
item in his hand (R. 147:169,176-77). Lourdes then told defendant to leave (R. 147: 166).
Maara's mother, Maria, found her downstairs (R. 148:18). Maara told her mother that
defendant was kissing her, but did not tell her any of the details "because [she] was scared
that [defendant] was going to kill [her] mother" (R. 147: 120-21). All Maara said was "I
can't tell you what happened mama, I can't tell you what happened"(R. 148: 18).
Maria was extremely upset, and when she saw defendant descending the stairs, she
picked up a stroller and hit him with it (R. 148: 21). Defendant ran out the door, and Maria
called the police (R.147:121; R.148: 21).
Maara told the first officer on the scene, Officer Rogich, only that defendant "pinned
her down" to kiss her and then "got up and forced her into the bedroom closet where his
children couldn't see him" where he "continued to kiss her some more" (R. 147:174). The
officer noted, however, that Maara seemed nervous and reserved because her parents were
in the room (id.). He requested the assistance of an officer with more experience questioning
child victims (R. 147: 174-75). Detective Mark Sessions spent some time developing a
rapport with Maara and ultimately interviewed her alone (R. 147:190). Maara told him that
"[defendant] put his hand over her mouth and told her not to say anything to anyone or he
would kill her mother. He then went to put his hand into her blouse area and fondled her
breasts and then put his hand down her bottoms and rubbed her genitals" (R. 147: 194).
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Maara explained to the detective that she did not disclose the details sooner because
defendant had threatened to kill her mother (R. 147: 193).
Proceedings Below
Translation of the word "knife." At trial, the prosecutor asked Lourdes if she
remembered telling the officers that defendant had waived a knife at her (R. 147:169). She
replied, "I don't remember if it was a knife or only the sheath, but yes [the defendant] did that
movement like that" (id.). Before trial began the next day, Mr. Mills, a juror, asked to speak
with the court (R. 148: 6). Mr. Mills, who served an LDS mission in Argentina, was
concerned that the interpreter did not use the correct word for pocket-knife (R. 148:6-7). The
court acknowledged his concern and instructed him to rely on the record evidence (R. 148:
7). The court then asked that Mr. Mills "not bring that up, you know, to the others. I mean
what you need to do is go with what the record is and what you've heard and how it was
interpreted" (R. 148: 8). Neither attorney raised any objection or concern about the
exchange.
Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Seven weeks after the jury delivered its guilty
verdict, defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on juror Mills' concern and a post-trial
conversation defense counsel memorialized in an affidavit (R. 100, 101-05) (affidavit
attached in Addendum A). The document paraphrased a discussion between defense counsel
and Mr. Mills, the jury foreperson, which allegedly occurred in the presence of seven of the
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eight jurors on the case (R. 101-05). According to the affidavit, Mr. Mills indicated that,
while he could understand the trial testimony,
[m]any of the jurors mentioned in deliberation that they had been unable to hear
the interpreter while she spoke on behalf of Mr. Corvera during his testimony and
'missed half of it' to paraphrase. Again several jurors present nodded or
commented in agreement that they could not hear the interpreter during [the
defendant's] testimony and they did not hear all of his testimony.
(Id.). The affidavit does not say that any of the jurors believed that the interpreter's volume
had prejudiced them against defendant or had been a factor in their deliberations.
Defendant was represented by new appointed counsel at the July 8, 2004, hearing on
his new trial motion (R. 124). Defense counsel did not present any additional evidence and
did not seek to question jurors. He relied solely on the affidavit. The trial judge commented,
"I do recall that there were two different translators. One was louder than the other. There
was no indication by anyone during the trial that that was [a] problem" (R. 124:10-11). The
judge also felt that the affidavit did not clearly indicate that the interpreter's volume affected
the verdict, and that it relied in part on defense counsel's interpretation of jurors' body
language (id.). Finally the court concluded:
I believe that if there was going to be grounds for saying that [the jury] did not
hear the interpretation and that weighed into their determination as to who was
telling the truth as between the victim and [defendant] in this case, that would
have been something that would had to have come forward. Not having that
here and just the affidavit that [defendant's counsel] states, I do not believe,
under the law as interpreted by our appellate courts, that that provides a basis
for a granting of a new trial.
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(R. 124: 11-12).
The Court then denied defendant's motion for a new trial, finding there was
"insufficient evidence or information to find that the defendant's right to a fair trial was
prejudiced in any way in relation to the translation or translators in this case" (R. 125) (order
attached in Addendum B). The court further held, "Specifically, there is not evidence that
the jury was prejudiced in any way in relation to the translation of the word knife or in
relation to the speaking volume of the translators" (id.). Add. B.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that '"certain practices pose such a threat to the fairness of the factfinding process' that they must be subjected to 'close judicial scrutiny.'" Aplt. Br. at 10
(quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04, 96 S. Ct 1691 (1976)). He argues that
the alleged failure of one interpreter to "effectively communicate" defendant's trial testimony
to the jurors constituted an "inherently prejudicial courtroom action" which required the trial
judge to conduct an inquiry to determine whether defendant's right to a fair trial was
violated. Id. at 9-10. However, defendant's argument is inadequately briefed and, hence,
should be summarily rejected by this Court.
Alternatively, the trial court properly rejected the claim based on insufficient evidence
where defendant relied solely on the affidavit of his former appointed counsel to argue that
the volume of one interpreter was so low that a majority of the jurors were unable to hear
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most of defendant's trial testimony, thereby prejudicially affecting their evaluation of his
credibility.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN APPROPRIATE INQUIRY
INTO AN ALLEGED PROBLEM WITH INTERPRETATION OF
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF ERROR
LACKS EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT AND IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED
Defendant contends that one of two interpreters at trial failed to "effectively
communicate" the trial testimony of defendant to the jurors, and that the failure "constituted
an inherently prejudicial courtroom action" which triggered a duty by the trial court to
conduct an inquiry commensurate with the risks inherent in such a situation. Aplt. Br. at 910. This Court may reject his claim one of two bases. First, defendant's failure to adequately
brief his claim prevents appellate review. Second, the record reveals insufficient evidence
to establish either that the interpreter could not be heard by the jurors or that the interpreter's
volume resulted in prejudice to defendant.
A.

This Court Should Refuse To Reach Defendant's Claim Due To Inadequate
Briefing
This Court should decline to address defendant's appellate argument because it is

inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a
defendant's brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled
9

to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah
1988) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)); see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4,
f 67, 57 P.3d 977 (rejecting inadequately briefed claim in death penalty case), cert, denied,
537 U.S. 863 (2002); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 46, n.5, 37 P.3d 1073.
Thus, "[ijmplicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah
1989). Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this Court
will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, U 12, 69 P.3d 1278.
Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [this Court will] decline to
reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, \ 12, 52 P.3d 467. In fact, "Utah
courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, If 28, 48 P.3d 872,
cert denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 138.
Defendant's argument fails on both points: he does not cite any relevant legal authority to
support his claim, and he fails to develop any meaningful legal analysis.
First, although defendant cites to legal authority, that authority is inapposite to his
claim. The cited case law provides generally for "close judicial scrutiny" in certain
10

circumstances that implicate the right to a fair trial. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,
567-68, 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05, 96 S. Ct. 1691
(1976); State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2,ffif15-19,40 P.3d 611; State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444,
121 P.2d 903, 905-06 (1942). In each instance, the trial court deliberately and openly used
a procedure or practice, and the concern was whether the established act or conduct was
"inherently prejudicial" under the circumstances.

See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567-73

(presence of four security officers seated in the first row of the spectator section near six
defendants through duration of trial); Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-12 (defendant's wearing of
prison clothes at trial); Daniels, 2002 UT 2, If 19 (trial inside prison); Vasquez, 121 P.2d at
905-06 (trial court's denial of Spanish-speaking defendant's request for an interpreter so that
he could understand the English-speaking witnesses).
This case involves no deliberate procedure or practice. None of the cases ever held, or
even implied, that an alleged problem which was neither raised nor apparent to the court or
the parties at the time of trial, triggers any duty on the part of the court to inquire as to the
possible effect of the alleged problem on defendant's right to a fair trial. Defendant failed
to establish that any interpreter spoke so softly as to create an "inherently prejudicial"
situation, and the record does not establish that a duty to inquire otherwise arose under the
circumstances of this case. Consequently, the authority cited by defendant does not support
his claim and does not satisfy his briefing requirement under rule 24(a)(9). See Pritchett,
2003 UT 24, \ 12 (holding that when appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this
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Court will "decline to find it for him5'); Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ^ 20 (stating "a reviewing
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research") (citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, defendant provides no meaningful analysis to establish his right to the relief
he seeks. See, e.g., Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (noting that rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority"); see also State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, \ 125, 63 P.3d 731 (this Court simply
"will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth' on behalf of defendants'"
(citation omitted)), reh 'g denied (Jan. 16,2003). In other words, he "fails to clearly analyze
what th[e cited] authority requires and how the facts of his case[] satisfies] these
requirements." Garner, 2002 UT App 234, \ 12 (quotations and citations omitted). He does
not, and cannot, develop the legal authority he cites in a manner relevant to the facts of this
case and he presents no meaningful analysis based on that authority because that authority
has no application where the existence of the problem was never properly established below.
He makes no attempt to establish why the volume of an interpreter-which was not a problem
for the court, counsel, or the court reporter—amounts to a judicial action which would trigger
the need for close judicial scrutiny of the claimed, but unestablished, error. He fails to
explain how an interpreter, whose accuracy is unchallenged on appeal and whose volume has
not been established to have been inaudible in the courtroom, presents an inherently
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prejudicial risk to defendant's right to a fair trial. He summarily accuses the trial court of
failing to conduct an appropriate inquiry, yet identifies no particular inquiry or scope of
inquiry which the trial court should have undertaken. Aplt. Br. at 9-10.
The appellate courts have stressed that they are not "a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 450 (citation
omitted). Defendant has so inadequately briefed the issue that he has effectively shifted the
burden of argument and research here. Consequently, this Court should decline to consider
his claim. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, \ 13, 974 P.2d 269 (declining to address
an inadequately briefed claim); Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^f 12 (declining to reach the
merits of defendant's claim where he failed "to offer any meaningful analysis") (citations
omitted).
B.

The Claim Fails Where Defendant Presented Insufficient Evidence Below To
Support It
In any event, defendant's claim fails because he failed below to establish the error upon

which his claim is based. In this case, defendant bore the burden below of establishing his
claim that he was denied a fair trial. See State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547, 551
(1947) (defendant failed to establish his claim in support of his motion for new trial); State
v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930, 932 (Utah App. 1991); see generally State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d
459, 463 (Utah 1989) ("The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset the
judgment"), overruled on other gnds by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280 (Utah App. 1994).
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Defendant's new trial motion was based, in part, on his claim that during presentation
of the defense at trial, one of the interpreters spoke too softly for many of the jurors to
understand (R. 100, 101-05). The trial court's written order denying defendant's new trial
motion provided:
1. There is insufficient evidence or information to find that the defendant's
right to a fair trial was prejudiced in any way in relation to the translation or
translators in this case.
2. Specifically, there is no evidence that the jury was prejudiced in any way
in relation to the translation of the word knife or in relation to the speaking
volume of the translators.
(R. 125). Defendant's appellate challenge rests on this same claim, although he does not
directly challenge these findings on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 7-10. Instead, he attempts to shift
to the trial court responsibility for establishing the existence of the problem and its effect on
the deliberation process by arguing that the defense affidavit triggered a duty to inquire on
the part of the trial court. Id.
The trial court correctly determined, however, that defendant possessed, and failed to
meet, the burden of establishing the claimed impropriety. Defendant summarily represents
on appeal that the record "demonstrates, at the very least, that the presentation of Mr.
Corvera's case was significantly hampered by the interpreter's failure to effectively
communicate Mr. Corvera's testimony . . . . " Id. at 9. The only part of the record he cites
anywhere in his brief to support this claim is defense counsel's affidavit. Id. at 2-3, 5-6.
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That is because he offered nothing else to support his claim below. Defense counsel
recognized at the hearing on his motion that the jurors could be subpoenaed to shed light on
the issue (R. 124:4,6). However, he sought no continuance to gather witnesses and offered
no affidavit from any juror verifying the content of his counsel's affidavit. He did not
identify what part of the testimony was not heard, its relevance to the proceedings, and,
hence, its potential for prejudice. He failed to present any additional evidence to support his
claim even after the issue of inadequate evidentiary support was expressly raised (R. 124: 56, 9). He sought no hearing pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
explore why his trial counsel did not recognize that an interpreting problem may exist and
seek to remedy it at the time of trial. Consequently, his claim that an error exists which
triggered a duty of inquiry rests solely on defense counsel's affidavit.
In contrast, the remainder of the record shows that the court and the parties recognized
at the beginning of the trial the need to take care in locating the interpreters in the courtroom
(R. 147: 80-81,106-07). Thereafter, neither the court, nor the parties, nor the court reporter,
nor any of the jurors gave any indication that part or all of any testimony or interpretation
was inaudible. The trial transcript provides an English translation of the defense testimony,
and the trial court expressly recognized that there was no indication at all of a volume
problem (R. 124: 7, 11). Even the juror who spoke to the court during trial about the
interpreter's translation of the word "knife" made no mention of any inability to understand
one of the interpreters.
15

Given the state of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the
evidence insufficient to establish any problem with the volume of the interpretation or the
degree to which such a problem may have prejudiced defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
trial court's order denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on //^September 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this y^oT September 2005, two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage-prepaid, to:
Scott L. Wiggins
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Appellant
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Addendum A

..rr.rr.fjiMKlCT COURT

LAURA K. THOMPSON #6328
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 7
Kaysville, UT 84037
Phone: (801) 898-2040
Fax: (801) 394-7706

Ml tt'G 2S

o

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMTNGTON DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF LAURA K.
THOMPSON IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL

Plaintiff,

GENARO PANTOJA CORVERA,

Case No. 011702002 FS
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

: ss.
)

The Affiant, LAURA K. THOMPSON, being first duly sworn and upon her oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

2.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar, and have so been since my

admittance to the practice of law in October 1992.
3.

The information contained in this Affidavit is true and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief, and is based upon my personal knowledge and recollection, except as
otherwise indicated.
4.

I am the attorney for the above-named Defendant, GENARO PANTOJA

'';• C n

CORVERA, and have been the only attorney of record for Mr. Corvera.
5.

I tried this case to jury trial on July 8-9, 2002 and was present during every moment

of the two-day trial.
6.

At the start of the second day of trial, the prosecuting attorney, Troy S. Rawlings,

and I were working on drafting a stipulation regarding certain evidence when we were interrupted
by the bailiff, who indicated that the judge wanted to see us in chambers because a juror, I
believe if was Bryant Mills, but the gentleman who ultimately was chosen as the jury foreperson,
wanted to speak to the judge.
7.

The judge indicated to us that Mr. Mills had indicated through the bailiff that he felt

the interpreter had not interpreted a word correctly during the testimony, as I recall, of Mr.
Corvera's wife, Lourdes Pantoja Corvera.
8.

At the start of the trial, Mr. Mills was allowed into the courtroom, without the other

jurors present, to state his concern before the Court on the record; he had felt that the interpreter
did not correctly interpret the word "knife."
9.

No other action was taken by the Court; in retrospect, the Court probably should

have admonished the juror not to share this concern with the other jurors.
10.

At the conclusion of the trial, after the verdict was read, I had occasion to talk with

most of the jurors in the hallway of the court building at 425 N. Wasatch Dr , Layton, Utah.
11

I would estimate 7 or 8 of the entire jury was present during this gathering; Mr.

Rawlings was also present.
12.

The jury foreperson, whom I believe was Bryant Mills, indicated that the verdict
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had boiled down to the victim's word versus the defendant's word, to paraphrase.
13.

Several jurors, I believe Benjamin Mitchell and Barbara Johnson, specifically,

nodded or commented in agreement that she was more believable than Mr. Corvera.
14.

The jury foreperson also went on to say that, while he was able to understand Mr.

Corvera's testimony because he speaks Spanish and listened to Mr. Corvera as he spoke in
Spanish, many of the jurors mentioned in deliberation that they had been unable to hear the
interpreter while she spoke on behalf of Mr. Corvera during his testimony and "missed half of
it," to paraphrase.
15.

Again, several jurors present nodded or commented in agreement that they could

not hear the interpreter during Mr. Corvera's testimony and they did not hear all of his testimony.
16.

At no time during Mr. Corvera's testimony in the course of the trial did any of the

jurors to my knowledge mention, complain, raise their hand or signal to the bailiff or Court that
they could not hear Mr. Corvera's testimony through the interpeter.
17.

My concerns include the following: a) that the jurors have no idea what the

substance of Mr. Corvera's testimony was and they only based their verdict on the victim's
testimony without due consideration of Mr. Corvera's testimony; or b) that the jury foreperson
interpreted or otherwise told the other jurors what Mr. Corvera's testimony was and they simply
relied on his impressions and version without duly considering Mr. Corvera's testimony on their
own because they never heard it.
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DATED this cx^'

"day of August, 2002

LAURA K THOMPSON
Attorney for Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^

<£* '-?x

day of August, 2002

JUDY DAWN BARKING

j ^ % mim PUBLIC 'STATE of ma
i' %2J!\ 5 |
427 27TH STREET
\\ % 1&JJ
OGDEN UT 84401

'<.. . . . . . 7

COMM. EXP. 05-15-2004

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this
day of August, 2002,1 delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Laura K Thompson in Support of Motion for New Trial to
Troy S Rawlings, Deputy Davis County Attorney, 800 W ^ t a t e St, Farmington, UT 84025
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Addendum B

FILED

Troy S. Rawlings, #6969
Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Fannington UT 84025
Telephone:
(801)451-4300
FAX:
(801)451-4328

SEP 2 7 2004
Layton District Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
GENARO PANTO J A CORVERA
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Case No. 011702002
Judge: Thomas L. Kay

This matter came before the court on the 8 day of July, 2004 before the Honorable
Thomas L Kay on defendant's Motion for New Trial. Based on the evidence and arguments, the
defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied based on the following:
1. There is insufficient evidence or information to find that the defendant's right to a fair
trial was prejudiced in any way in relation to the translation or translators in this case.
2. Specifically, there is no evidence that the jury was prejudiced in any way in relation to
the translation of the word knife or in relation to the speaking volume of the translators.
It is Hereby Oidered that the defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.
DATED September ¥fr2004.
BY THE COURT:

Thomas L. Kay i /
District Court Judgve
Order denying defendant's motio for new ti

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I certify that I mailed/delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial to Richard M. Gallegos, Attorney for Defendant,
Public Defender Box, Davis County Justice Complex on September 17, 2004,

H^> c^-fty*-^
Secretary

